Registry
No registry incident yet turns on a failed telemetry integrity control
None of the 19 incidents in the 137AI Incident Registry records a failure of this control. That reflects what public sources disclose about each incident, not proof the control works; the failures that did surface sit under behavioral envelopes, human oversight and access control.
Implementations
Vehicle regulators lead: China and UNECE require tamper-resistant records and update control
China's GB 44497-2024 requires automated-driving data recorders on new vehicles. UN R155 and R156 require a cybersecurity management system and controlled software updates for EU type approval. NHTSA's Standing General Order requires crash reports when automation was active within 30 seconds of a crash. Research teams have shifted lidar localization by up to 8.4 m, wider than a traffic lane.
| Implementation | Vendor or body | Country | What it enforces | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Automated-driving data storage system (GB 44497-2024) | MIIT, SAMR and SAC | China | Mandatory recording of automated-driving operating and event data | Effective Jan 1, 2026 |
| Cybersecurity management system (UN R155) | UNECE WP.29 | International | Fleet attack monitoring across the vehicle lifecycle | All new EU vehicles from Jul 1, 2024 |
| Software update management system (UN R156) | UNECE WP.29 | International | Software IDs and validated, documented updates | Jul 1, 2024 |
| Standing General Order crash reporting | NHTSA | United States | Reports of crashes within 30 seconds of ADS or Level 2 use | Third amendment effective Jun 16, 2025 |
Row color shows the agent class served: orange physical, teal personal and ambient, blue software.
Recent events
- Lithuanian pilots filed a record 1,022 interference reports in June 2025.
- Windward counted GNSS disruption to between 693 and 1,155 ships a day in the Gulf and Hormuz during June 2025.
- China's Supreme People's Court said on September 7, 2026 that courts may order event-record data produced to decide crash causes.
- GB 44495 was amended on January 28, 2026 to apply to new type approvals from July 1, 2026.
Exposure
Perception and sensors rates very significant or critical for 12 of 17 agent types
The telemetry integrity discipline covers the perception and sensors dimension of the agent attack surface ratings. These agent types depend on it most.
| Agent type | Dimension | Rating | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| Robotaxis and autonomous vehicles | Perception and sensors | Very significant | Cameras, lidar, radar, GNSS, and IMU |
| Humanoid robots | Perception and sensors | Very significant | Cameras, depth sensors, lidar in some models, microphones, IMU and proprioception |
| Industrial robots and cobots | Perception and sensors | Very significant | Safety scanners and force sensing decide when to slow or stop |
| Autonomous trucks | Perception and sensors | Very significant | Cameras, lidar, radar, GNSS, IMU |
| Drones | Perception and sensors | Very significant | GNSS spoofing and camera blinding mislead navigation |
| Phones and tablets | Perception and sensors | Very significant | Cameras, microphones, location, biometric sensors, motion sensors |
| Wearables | Perception and sensors | Very significant | Cameras, microphones, biosensors are the primary value of the device |
| Vehicle cabin AI | Perception and sensors | Very significant | Interior cameras, microphones, biometric sensors, presence detection, increasingly RF-based occupant sensing |
| Smart home assistants | Perception and sensors | Very significant | Always-on microphones, cameras with computer vision, motion and presence sensors, environmental sensors |
| Medical devices | Perception and sensors | Very significant | Medical imaging, biosensors, ECG, glucose, vital signs |
| Public infrastructure | Perception and sensors | Very significant | Cameras, microphones, RF sensors, environmental sensors typically operating continuously |
| Ambient sensors | Perception and sensors | Very significant | Cameras, microphones, palm and Wi-Fi sensing are the product |
Rules
Recording and cybersecurity duties are in force for vehicles; general AI logging is delayed
| Rule | Jurisdiction | What it requires | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| GB 44497-2024 automated-driving data recording | China | Mandatory event data recording for automated driving | Effective Jan 1, 2026 |
| GB 44495-2024 vehicle cybersecurity | China | Cybersecurity management plus interface, update and data tests | Effective Jan 1, 2026 |
| UN R155 and R156 | UNECE / EU | Cybersecurity and software update management for type approval | All new EU vehicles from Jul 1, 2024 |
| NHTSA Standing General Order, third amendment | US | ADS and Level 2 crash reporting within five days for the most severe | Effective Jun 16, 2025 |
| EU AI Act Article 12 | EU | Automatic event logging over a high-risk system's lifetime | Delayed to Dec 2, 2027 |
Status colors: green in force, blue voluntary standard or framework, amber adopted and phasing in, gray draft or pending, red withdrawn.
Limits
Signing and logging prove data was not altered after capture, not that the sensor saw the world correctly
Spoofed GPS or lidar produces validly signed false data, so cross-checks between independent sensors still matter.
Record
Page Record
- Datasets
- ai_control_implementations.csv (4 rows for this page); ai_incident_controls.csv (0 linked); ai_attack_surface.csv
- Key sources
- MIIT, SAMR and SAC
NHTSA
UNECE WP.29 - Source notes
- Automated-driving data storage system (GB 44497-2024): secondary source; Cybersecurity management system (UN R155): secondary source; Software update management system (UN R156): secondary source
- Last verified
- October 2026